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Abstract
Over the last 60 years, the multilateral management of trade through the GATT and subse-
quently through the WTO has been led by the United States and Europe. Since the turn of the
new millennium, however, developing countries have increasingly used their leverage to insist that
talks on agriculture receive priority attention, deny the inclusion of investment and competition
policy on the negotiating agenda, and block agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture
and non-agricultural market access (NAMA). Cooperation between the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union is still essential, but no longer sufﬁcient, for successful multilateral negotiations.
Speciﬁcally, the “BRICKs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Korea) are likely to be pivotal in
directing the course and contributing to the success or failure of the WTO.
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Six decades ago, representatives from 23 countries signed the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Participating nations included the dominant 
powers of the time (the United States and United Kingdom), countries whose 
stardom in world trade would surface only at the end of the century (Brazil, 
China, and India), and others whose role in the world economy would rapidly 
diminish in subsequent years (Burma, Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, and Southern 
Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe).  Six members of the European Union (Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) 
were among the original signatories. 
Due to historical accident, or more precisely the unwillingness of the US 
Congress to ratify the Charter for an International Trade Organization, the GATT 
served as the foundation for world trade rules until superseded by the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995.  The 
GATT draftsmen drew heavily on precedents from the US Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 as well as the experience of the British imperial 
preferences.  By design and by participation, the GATT had a distinct transatlantic 
orientation—though at the onset the primus inter pares was the United States, the 
dominant economic and military power in the Western world.   
The first decade of the GATT could be called the age of US enlightened 
self-interest.  Half of the eight multilateral trade rounds under the GATT took 
place during this first decade and primarily produced substantial reductions in US 
tariffs (see appendix A for a list of the GATT/WTO trade rounds).  For example, 
the first GATT Round in Geneva (1947) resulted in US commitments to cut its 
industrial tariffs by 26 percent and arguably helped kick start the economic 
recovery from the devastation of the Second World War.
1  US trade liberalization, 
in conjunction with generous amounts of development assistance through the 
Marshall Plan and other programs, provided an “economic stimulus package” to 
help rebuild the war-torn economies of Western Europe and thereby ensure a 
stable economic base for democratic governance and a reliable buffer against 
Soviet expansionism.  Indeed, these foreign policy and security interests were key 
drivers of US unilateral liberalization during the first decade of the postwar 
period. 
The United States was the demandeur of all eight GATT rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  The initial four rounds focused on reconstruction 
and development.  Since then, however, US interest in pushing new multilateral 
negotiations largely reflected the need to address issues on the transatlantic 
agenda, notably: (1) trade preferences and subsidies provided to spur European 
                                                 
1 WTO 2007, 207.  The WTO paper reports weighted tariff reductions of industrial countries for 
industrial products in each of the eight GATT rounds between 1947 and 1994. 
1
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in tariff schedules and distortions resulting from the enlargement of the European 
Communities (EC); and/or (3) major transatlantic trade disputes (e.g., concerning 
the Domestic International Sales Corporation subsidies, and the American Selling 
Price for chemical products).  As a practical matter, the Kennedy Round (1963-
1967) and the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) largely encompassed a transatlantic 
agenda and were dominated by US and European negotiators.
2 
 
Challenges to US-European Hegemony in the Post-GATT Era 
 
In the GATT rounds, a US-EC compact generally was sufficient to seal a deal.  
To be sure, there were other active participants, particularly Canada, Japan, 
Australia, and the Nordic countries, but the major decisions came from Brussels 
and Washington.  Under the GATT’s myriad provisions on “special and 
differential” (S&D) treatment, developing countries were not required to offer 
reciprocal liberalization of their own trade barriers, and with a few notable 
exceptions those countries stayed on the sidelines.  While they benefited from the 
liberalization commitments entered into by the United States and the European 
Community under the GATT’s most favored nation (MFN) obligation, all too 
often that liberalization excluded or gave short shrift to the priority export 
interests of the developing countries.  No wonder that—after eight rounds of 
multilateral trade reforms—the remaining barriers protecting the US and 
European markets primarily target the competitive agricultural and manufactured 
exports of developing countries. 
The Uruguay Round broke from these negotiating precedents by requiring 
that all the issues under negotiation be considered part of a “single undertaking” 
to which all participants had to commit.  Developing countries could no longer be 
“free riders” as in past rounds and several of them participated actively in the 
negotiations.  But the US and EC officials still determined the basic content of the 
trade package because of an extraordinary development:  the late inclusion during 
the course of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on an agreement to establish the 
WTO.  This accord established a new organization that strengthened the 
institutional structure of the trading system and superseded the GATT.  In so 
doing, it created a dilemma for developing countries, since if a country declined 
to sign the comprehensive Uruguay Round accords as a package, it would not 
qualify to join the new WTO (and thus might no longer maintain its MFN rights).  
The institutional reform essentially gave the major trading powers substantial 
leverage to force developing countries to accept a broad range of new trade 
obligations (albeit with some S&D provisions) in the Uruguay Round—whether 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Evans 1971; and Winham 1986. 
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provisions.
3  Indeed, one of the WTO’s main problems has been how to respond 
to demands by developing countries for compensation for the extensive 
obligations effectively imposed on them in the last GATT round. 
The concept of a single undertaking carried over into the WTO era and has 
been part of the framework of the Doha Round, launched in November 2001.  
However, in a 180 degree reversal from the Uruguay Round precedent, this 
procedural requirement now gives developing countries some leverage to push 
their own export interests— if US and EU officials do not address their priority 
demands, then developing countries can simply prevent the Doha Round deal 
from closing. 
In a nutshell, this situation explains the first seven years of the Doha 
Round.  Developing countries have used the leverage of the single undertaking to 
insist that talks on agriculture receive priority attention, deny the inclusion of 
investment and competition policy on the negotiating agenda, and block 
agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) until they receive broad flexibility to exempt their sensitive 
products from the trade liberalization. 
Cooperation between the United States and the European Union is still 
essential, but no longer sufficient, for successful multilateral negotiations.  US 
and European hegemony, so prominent in the GATT era, has been compromised 
by the rapid development of a number of developing countries that have 
substantial and growing stakes in the world trading system and accordingly now 
claim a more prominent role in the WTO’s decision making process. 
The following sections examine the growth of five countries that have 
begun over the last decade to assert their interests in the WTO and/or will likely 
do so in the near future, and their impact on transatlantic trade policies.  The 
paper concludes with recommendations on how the United States and the 
European Union should work together with the major developing countries to 
unblock the Doha Round and restore vitality to the multilateral trading system. 
 
The WTO System and the BRICKs 
 
Most observers, as well as the conference organizers, posit that the transatlantic 
leaders of the WTO face a “Défi Asiatique.”  Such a narrow geographic focus 
understates the importance of Brazil and the potential role of Russia upon its 
accession to the WTO, in tandem with the new Asian trading powers:  China, 
India, and Korea.  With a respectful bow to the highly overpaid pundits of global 
finance, I label these countries the “BRICKs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
                                                 
3 This problem was particularly severe with regard to the agreement on trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights, or TRIPS. 
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4  I include Russia because it could soon enter the WTO and subsequently 
influence the future of the WTO in key areas like energy, climate change, and 
investment.
5  All of the BRICK countries already are a major focus of US and EU 
trade policy.  Looking forward over the next decade, these five countries are 
likely to be pivotal in directing the course and contributing to the success or 
failure of the WTO. 
To understand why, it is sufficient to look at their rapid economic growth 
and the sharp increase in global trade in general, and trade with the United States 
and the European Union in particular.  Tables 1 and 2 report the size and 
increasing global engagement of the BRICKs.  At market exchange rates, their 
combined 2008 GDP is almost $10 trillion or almost 70 percent that of the United 
States and almost twice as large as the Japanese economy.
6  Looked at another 
way, the economies of Brazil, India, and Korea together are almost as large as 
China; government officials should keep that statistic in mind lest their trade 
policies toward emerging markets become too China-centric. 
Of course, the size of these economies is only part of the story; they also 
are among the fastest growing economies in the world—and thus have become the 
focus of many firms (and farmers) seeking new export opportunities.  China has 
led the way with double digit growth between 2004 and 2007, with India and 
Russia recording average annual growth of almost 9 and 7 percent during that 
time, respectively.  Brazil and Korea have not achieved the same success, but 
their growth has been robust compared to the transatlantic economies.  While not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
4 Recall also that three of these countries were original signatories to the GATT but secondary 
players in the GATT era.   
5 The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 pushed Russia’s WTO accession 
negotiations to the backburner, much like China’s talks were deferred after the massacre in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989.  Then, in June 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that 
Russia will first complete a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan so that all three countries 
can join the WTO together; these conditions, if maintained, could set back the accession process 
by years. 
6 Using purchasing power parity (PPP) data, the combined 2007 GDP of the BRICKs is slightly 
larger than US GDP and 3.5 times greater than Japanese GDP. See IMF 2008. 
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          ($  billion  and  %)
      2008 
GDP 
(Current 
$) 
Real GDP Growth (year on year, %) 
     
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
e 
Brazil  1573 5.7 3.2 4.0 5.7 5.1 -1.3 
Russia  1677 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 -6.0 
India  1210 7.9 9.2 9.8 9.3 7.3 4.5 
China  4402  10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0  9.0  6.5 
Korea  947  4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.2 -4.0 
Subtotal  9,808        
            
Memorandum:          
  US  14,265  3.6 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.1 -2.8 
  Japan    4,924 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4 -0.6  -6.2 
    EU  (27)  18,394  2.6 2.2 3.4 3.1 1.1 -4.0 
e:  Estimates          
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 
 
 
Table 2. The BRICKS: Global Exports and Imports 
              
            ($  billion)
   1993    2000    2007 
   X  M     X  M     X  M 
Brazil  39 31   60 62   174 136
Russia  44 27   103 34   344 239
India  21 21   43 50   151 247
China  92 104   249 225   1,218 967
Korea  86 87    172 160    361 365
Subtotal 282  270 627 531 2,248  1,954
            
World 
Total 2,749  2,880   4,744 5,046   10,250 10,952
(excluding intra-EU)                    
              
X: Exports to World; M: Imports from World. 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics CD ROM, July 2008, IMF 
5
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continued to grow markedly while Korea and Brazil have experienced shallower 
GDP declines than many other major trading nations.
7 
The trade and investment profile of the BRICKs also grew substantially 
between 1993 and 2007.  Since 1993, the BRICKs together have more than 
doubled their share of world exports (table 2).  In 1993, the five countries together 
accounted for $282 billion or 10 percent of world exports.  By 2007, the BRICKs 
exported $2,248 billion worth of goods or 22 percent of the world total.  China 
accounted for 57 percent of that growth; the rest came from Russia (15 percent), 
Korea (14 percent), and Brazil and India (7 percent each). 
A substantial share of this trade has been with the transatlantic nations (see 
table 3).  In 2007, the BRICKs accounted for 26.2 percent and 19.2 percent of 
total EU and US merchandise trade, respectively.  Since 2000, EU trade with the 
BRICKs has more than tripled to almost $970 billion in 2007 (of which $408 
billion or 42 percent was with China); US trade with the BRICKs increased two 
and a half times over this period and totaled about $612 billion in 2007 (of which 
$405 billion or 66 percent was with China). 
Also notable is the growing role of the BRICKs as hosts for substantial 
amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI).  At year-end 2007, the stock of FDI 
in the BRICKs was valued at about $2.4 trillion and represented over half of the 
FDI invested in developing countries (see table 4).
8  According to UNCTAD 
(2008), the BRICKs attracted $256 billion in FDI in 2007 or about 14 percent of 
world FDI flows that year. 
The emergence of the BRICKs over the past decade has had important 
implications for the Doha Round.  Simply put, bigger markets mean these 
countries have more “chips” on the table in Geneva and more leverage to broker 
deals among the large and diverse WTO membership.
9  Brazil and India assumed 
key roles in the Doha Round, joining the United States and the European Union in 
the so-called “G-4” informal steering group of the Doha Round that replaced the 
defunct “Quad” countries that mismanaged WTO talks in the previous decade. As 
a practical matter, Brazil and India replaced Japan and Canada in this grouping. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The exception is Russia; the IMF projects a 6 percent decline in GDP in 2009. 
8 These data include inward FDI attributed to “China, Hong Kong” as reported in UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2007. 
9 To be sure, some smaller developing countries have been active on single issue or sectoral talks 
(eg, West African cotton exporting nations), but have limited ability to exercise their implicit 
blocking power—unless they are willing to risk bringing the entire multilateral process to a halt. 
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In August 2003, in the run-up to the WTO ministerial in Cancún the 
following month, Brazil organized a WTO “G-20” caucus of developing countries 
to coordinate positions on the Doha Round’s agricultural negotiations.  Though 
this group initially was criticized for contributing to the collapse of that 
ministerial, it subsequently played a constructive role in bridging differences 
between developed and developing country positions (and in muting extreme 
national positions among its diverse membership).  To a lesser extent, India has 
followed a similar script in co-chairing work on trade in services.  China’s role 
has been more low-key and arguably counter to its overriding interest in a viable 
multilateral trading system; it is a member of several developing country 
coalitions but has not challenged others to commit to the level of openness to 
trade that it adopted in its protocol of accession to the WTO (and has 
subsequently augmented on an applied basis). 
Among the BRICKs, only Korea has in most instances stayed on the 
sidelines.  Korean officials seem to have discounted the potential outcome of the 
Doha Round from the start, instead pursuing regional trade pacts with their major 
trading partners in Asia, North America, and (most recently) Europe (as discussed 
further below). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. US and EU Trade with BRICKs in 2000 and 2007 
             ( $   b i l l i o n )  
   Brazil Russia India China  Korea  Total 
   X  M X  M X  M  X M X  M X  M 
US 2000  15.2 14.4  2.3  7.8  3.7 11.0 16.0 106.2 27.3 40.9  64.4 180.4 
US 2007  24.6 27.2  7.4  20.2 17.6 25.1 65.2 340.1 34.7 49.3 149.5 462.0 
                     
EU27 2000  15.4 17.9  21.1  58.8 12.1 12.0 23.6  63.5 15.1 24.6  87.5 176.8 
EU27 2007  29.2 44.5 122.4 197.9 40.5 35.8 98.4 309.3 34.2 54.3 324.7 641.9 
                  
Note:                  
Global US exports and imports in 2007 in billions were $1,163 and $2,017 respectively, and in 
2000, exports and imports were $772 and $1,238 respectively. 
Extra-EU27 exports and imports in 2007 in billions were $1,716 and $1,980 respectively, and in 
2000, exports and imports were $783 and $927 respectively. 
X: US or EU Exports to BRICKs; M: US or EU Imports from BRICKs 
                  
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics CD ROM, July 2008, IMF 
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        ($ billion)   
   Inflows    Stock 
Brazil 35     328   
Russia   52     324   
India 23     76   
China
a 143     1,512   
Korea 3     120    
Subtotal 256       2,360   
          
Developing Countries  500     4,247   
World 1,833       15,211    
a: Includes FDI into mainland China and Hong Kong.    
          
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008, tables B1, B2.   
 
The role of the BRICKs in the WTO may have taken a decisive turn in the 
failed efforts in late July 2008 to achieve a breakthrough in long-stalled 
deliberations on the modalities for negotiating liberalization of agriculture and 
manufactures in the Doha Round.  For the first time, China agreed to participate 
in the informal Doha steering group, raising hopes that it would share 
responsibility for moving the talks forward by contributing new market access 
offers.  In the event, however, China aligned instead with India in opposing farm 
reforms for their economies—to the disappointment of Brazil and many other 
developing countries—and thus contributed to the breakdown in the negotiations.  
In so doing, the Chinese defection weakened the influence of the G-20 caucus in 
the Doha negotiations. 
Yet only a few months later, another G-20 gained global prominence, 
linking the major trading nations in common effort to confront the global financial 
crisis.  Brazil and Korea comprise two-thirds of the G-20 “leadership troika” 
along with the United Kingdom.  At the G-20 summits in Washington (November 
2008) and London (April 2009), the BRICKs actively pushed for a standstill on 
new trade protection and a revival of Doha negotiations as part of the broader 
response to the global crisis.  Clearly, in this context, the BRICKs recognized the 
imperative of their participation in the stewardship of the world economy. 
The rise of the BRICKs also has coincided with the proliferation of a 
dynamic new regionalism in the world trading system.  To be sure, regionalism 
has always been part and parcel of the postwar trading system.  As noted earlier, 
the GATT rules were developed off the template of US bilateral treaties in the 
1930s and contain broad-ranging exceptions from the GATT’s fundamental MFN 
principle.  Apart from the series of accords that propelled the agglomeration of the 
8
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during the GATT’s first three decades were sideshows to the various rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations.
10 And as I noted in my 2004 analysis of free trade 
agreements, the United States acceded to these European initiatives “in deference 
to broader security concerns, because they helped to build a stronger and more 
unified European Community against the Soviet threat.”
11  The developing 
country pacts also were not challenged but for a different reason: because those 
countries didn’t undertake substantial GATT obligations, their regional trade 
preferences didn’t make much of a difference. 
   But regionalism has taken on a different flavor since the start of the 21
st 
century.  The locus of much of the activity has been East Asia, spurred in large 
measure by the goal of codifying the network of trade and investment linking 
China with its neighbors in Northeast and Southeast Asia.  This reorientation 
reflected to some extent a reaction to the Asian financial crises of 1997-1998 and 
the desire to develop regional responses to regional problems, but the new interest 
in FTAs has less to do with an ideological shift away from WTO principles and 
more to do with the importance of China in the regional economy. 
China propelled the advance of Asian regionalism with its overtures to the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) soon after its entry into the 
WTO in late 2001.  Japan and Korea were then compelled to emulate the Chinese 
initiative, leading to the existing array of agreements between the 10-member 
ASEAN and China, Japan, and Korea (the so-called “10 + 1” agreements).  These 
parallel pacts, though somewhat different in scope and depth of liberalization 
commitments, have raised the prospect of a “10 + 3” accord uniting the north-east 
and south-east Asian countries into a large Asian trading bloc that could provide a 
“Plan B” if the WTO talks collapse.  These intra-Asian regional accords also pose 
a challenge for US and EU engagement in the region (as discussed in more detail 
later in this paper). 
Korea has followed the most aggressive regional strategy of all the 
BRICKs, pursuing trade pacts with all of its major trading partners.  In addition to 
the Korea-ASEAN pact noted above, Korea signed an FTA with the United States 
in June 2007 that awaits ratification; launched negotiations on a similar deal with 
the European Union that are nearing completion in 2009; concluded a 
comprehensive economic partnership agreement with India in August 2009; 
revived FTA talks with Japan that have been stalled since December 2004; and 
advanced consultations with China with the aim to open negotiations on a 
                                                 
10 Developing countries engaged in a series of ill-defined and mostly failed ventures at regional 
integration.  The United States only entered the FTA “market” in the mid-1980s, concentrating its 
efforts on its Western Hemisphere neighborhood until the turn of the century. For a discussion, see 
Schott 2004.  
11 Schott 2004, 5. 
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of its trade efforts into regional deals in expectation of a Doha disappointment. 
The other BRICKs also have actively pursued regional trade deals since 
the onset of the Doha Round.  Brazil has sought to broaden its Mercosur 
partnership to its other South American neighbors, and opened new talks with 
South Africa and India.  These initiatives complement Brazil’s WTO strategy but 
do not substitute for a comprehensive WTO deal that would open US and 
European markets to Brazilian agricultural exports—that remains Brazil’s #1 
trade priority.  In contrast, India’s new bilateralism (including its ongoing but 
troubled FTA negotiations with the European Union) seeks to substitute partial 
scope deals for a comprehensive WTO accord, underscoring India’s resistance to 
conferring MFN benefits to major trading countries (particularly China) in the 
Doha Round. 
Academics and politicians continue to argue whether these initiatives are a 
boon or the bane of the WTO.
12  In any event, the BRICKs have been important 
drivers of preferential trading arrangements—both to complement ongoing WTO 
negotiations and to hedge against the possibility that the Doha Round could yield 
only modest results or fail outright. 
 
The BRICK Backlash 
 
The rise of the BRICKs has been a mixed blessing for WTO members, who value 
the commercial opportunities available in the dynamic BRICK economies but 
worry about (1) competing against these countries for foreign investment and 
exports, and (2) deflecting import surges from the BRICKs that threaten to swamp 
their domestic markets.  These concerns have become even more intense in light 
of the global recession and sharp contraction in world trade and investment.   
Consequently, many developing countries are reluctant to consider new 
liberalization in the Doha Round because they already face problems adjusting to 
competition in both home and export markets from China and other major 
developing countries.  These concerns are compounded by the reluctance of the 
BRICKs to offer substantial cuts of their own trade barriers in the Doha Round, 
especially in areas of export interest to other developing countries. 
These tensions are also evident in the United States and Europe, which 
both face growing competition abroad and growing restiveness at home due to 
concerns about the impact of trade and investment on domestic production and 
employment.  While exporters and investors see opportunities for economic 
recovery and growth in the BRICKs, other domestic firms and workers warn 
about footloose industries and the offshoring of jobs.  Their concerns have 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Schott 2004; Warwick Commission 2007; and Baldwin and Thorton 2008. 
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and combat job dislocation.  
Both the European Union and the United States have used trade policy as 
part of the response to the adjustment pressures resulting from globalization in 
general and competition from China in particular.  These external forces shape 
trade negotiating priorities and the use of trade remedies to combat unfair imports.  
In both markets, antidumping measures have been deployed frequently to blunt 
import growth from East Asia, particularly in the areas of textiles, apparel, and 
footwear.  Both the United States and the European Union also fight fire with fire, 
deploying their own trade-distorting subsidies and trade restrictions to protect 
their farmers and to shield producers of biofuels from competitive imports from 
Brazil. 
The financial crisis has exacerbated this protectionist streak.  Pledges by 
the G-20 countries to reject protectionism have been honored in the breach.   
Major economies have moved to support ailing domestic industries, particularly 
the automobile industry, in contravention of the letter or spirit of WTO rules.  
Illustrative of such measures are the “Buy American” provisions included in the 
$787 billion economic stimulus bill passed by the US Congress in February 2009.  
Potentially even more troublesome are the extensive subsidies provided in the 
United States and Europe to help restructure domestic auto makers and parts 
suppliers.
13  In addition, the American Climate and Energy Security Act 
(ACESA), that passed the House of Representatives in June 2009, contains 
provisions that could require the imposition of US trade barriers against carbon 
intensive goods from China, India, Brazil and others if those countries fail to 
adopt climate policies comparable to those of the United States. 
Additional and broader measures also are being vetted to counter China’s 
undervalued currency.  US legislation targeting China has gone through several 
iterations; initial threats to impose across-the-board import tariffs of 27.5 percent 
if China did not revalue the renminbi have been replaced by seemingly more 
WTO-friendly demands that US officials challenge the Chinese currency regime 
under the provisions of GATT Article XV.  In the face of a weak economy with 
rising unemployment, members of Congress will be increasingly receptive to 
legislation that threatens trade retaliation in the absence of Chinese currency 
reforms. 
For both transatlantic partners, China bashing has become allied with 
renewed calls for economic nationalism, the blood brother of trade protectionism.  
Several years ago, public outcries in the United States doomed the proposed 
Chinese purchase of UNOCAL.  More recently, investments by sovereign wealth 
funds, especially those from the Middle East and East Asia, have provoked 
                                                 
13 See Brunel and Hufbauer 2009. 
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in US East Coast seaports in 2006,
14 and the Bain-Huawei offer to buy 3Com fell 
apart after critical scrutiny of the deal by the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS).  We could well see more such cases on the CFIUS 
docket in the coming years. 
Like their US counterparts, EU officials face strong anti-globalization 
undercurrents that reflect economic insecurity, trade protectionism, and economic 
nationalism.  Concerns about East Asian trade, jobs exported to Eastern Europe 
and Asia, and increased immigration continue to echo major themes in the US 
political debate.  Investment policies of EU member states are being contorted to 
develop national champions to defend the national patrimony against intrusions 
by China and, more recently, sovereign wealth funds.  My fear is that additional 
sectors will be classified as “strategic” and targeted for protection—including 
information technology and telecommunications as well as energy production and 
distribution.  It’s not hard to see how the current clamor could lead to further calls 
for national ownership of strategic assets, and in turn provide a political excuse to 
block reforms involving establishment in goods and services industries. 
In sum, the rise of the BRICKs creates new opportunities and challenges 
for US and EU policy and for the management of WTO negotiations.  What can 
the United States and European Union do to deflect protectionist impulses at 
home and respond constructively to these new challenges?  I offer a few tentative 
thoughts in the next section of this paper. 
 
How Should the Transatlantic Partners Respond? 
 
The United States and the European Union are the world’s largest economic 
entities by far and remain the leaders of the world trading system.  No other 
country seems to be ready or willing to accept the leadership mantle and 
responsibility for contributing to WTO reforms.  The BRICKs are performing 
relatively well under the current system and seem to discount the possibility that 
the current protections of the global trading rules could unravel, with subsequent 
adverse consequences for their economic development.  Put another way, they act 
as if the WTO status quo is sustainable, and that the transatlantic powers will 
continue to accept the cost of maintaining the rules-based multilateral trading 
system. Their behavior during the July 2008 WTO meetings in Geneva would 
seem to validate this assessment. 
How should the United States and the European Union respond to the 
BRICKs?  Some observers propose closer integration of the transatlantic 
economies, perhaps through convergence of regulatory policies as part of a 
                                                 
14 See Graham and Marchick 2006. 
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and competitiveness vis-à-vis the BRICKs.
15  Such efforts are desirable, provided 
that they avoid discrimination against third countries; otherwise, they could 
significantly erode the foundation of the rules-based multilateral trading system.  
Others counsel the traditional strategy of crafting a joint approach to new trade 
initiatives in the WTO (as done in the area of environmental goods and services in 
the Doha Round) and renouncing the bilateral critiques of each other’s proposals 
that have fueled the dueling press conferences throughout the Doha Round.   
Can the United States and European Union work together to foster better 
trade relations with the BRICKs and to improve prospects for successful 
initiatives in the WTO?  In many respects, the United States and European Union 
already are emulating major components of each other’s policy.  However, joint 
action is impeded by problems in several areas of transatlantic relations:  “big 
ticket” bilateral trade disputes, regulatory competition, and competing 
regionalism--especially in Asia. 
The most prominent bilateral disputes involve aircraft and biofuels 
subsidies and genetically modified (GM) foods; all are being litigated in the 
WTO.  The United States and the European Union have challenged each other’s 
subsidies to Boeing and Airbus, respectively, in parallel cases now subject to 
WTO dispute settlement.  Similar tit-for-tat WTO litigation has been advanced 
against each other’s biofuels policies.  In addition, the United States has 
challenged in the WTO the unofficial EU moratorium on approving GM products 
for entry into the EU market.  Despite a WTO panel ruling against the EU 
measure, EU compliance has been deterred by strong popular opposition to GM 
foods within Europe.   
  Regulatory policies also have become a fertile ground for transatlantic 
rivalry, as each side attempts to encourage the adoption of international standards 
that emulate its own practices and policy objectives.  Such competition is already 
rampant in telecommunications and other high technology sectors.  In this regard, 
each side deploys bilateral or regional pacts to harmonize specific trading rules 
and standards based on its own law and practice, and to develop “WTO-plus” 
provisions in the areas of services, investment, and intellectual property tailored 
to its regulatory standards that can then set precedents for broader international 
regimes.  For the United States, such competition could be increasingly 
troublesome at a time when the European Union is accelerating its negotiating 
activity while new US FTA ventures are on hold pending a policy review by the 
Obama administration and formulation of new US legislation to replace the 
expired “fast track” trade negotiating authority.  
                                                 
15 See Atlantic Council 2007. 
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cooperation.  For the past two decades, the United States and the European Union 
have launched separate but similar trade initiatives with their main trading 
partners; in other words, regional trade policy of the transatlantic powers has 
followed a strategy of “competitive liberalization.”
16  In most instances, and 
particularly since the establishment of the WTO, the European Union has sought 
to emulate US agreements. 
Table 5 provides a summary of this increasingly global trade competition. The 
geographic reach of EU regional trade initiatives now extends well beyond the 
European neighborhood and involves negotiations in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America.  In 2007, EU officials formally lifted their hortatory, self-imposed ban 
on new FTA initiatives during the Doha Round and launched negotiations in 
May-June 2007 with South Korea, India, and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).
17  The EU is currently emulating US talks with Korea and the  
ASEAN.  In Korea, EU officials seek a comparable deal to the US-Korea FTA 
signed in June 2007 and awaiting ratification in each legislature. In contrast to the 
fragmented US approach with the ASEAN—which includes the 2004 US-
Singapore FTA, stalled FTA talks with Thailand and Malaysia, and the US-
ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement of 2006 Asia - the 
European Union seeks a free trade deal with the 10-member ASEAN group. With 
India, EU efforts to craft a bilateral FTA seek to go further than the nascent US 
initiatives, which to date have focused on a possible bilateral investment treaty in 
the context of the newly-created US-India Trade Policy Forum. 
Like the United States, the European Union has not sought free trade talks 
with China; instead, it is seeking to establish new consultative forums (emulating 
to some extent the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue but with a Brussels-
style nameplate, the High Level Trade Mechanism) to discuss the growing EU 
bilateral trade deficit with China, the Chinese currency regime, EU antidumping 
cases against Chinese products, and other matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The term was coined by my colleague, Fred Bergsten, and later adopted by US Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick as a keystone of US trade policy in the Bush administration.  See 
Bergsten 1996. 
17 In addition, EU and Japanese business lobbies are exploring the costs and benefits of opening 
talks on a trade deal comparable to the EU-Korea FTA that is likely to be signed in 2009. 
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a 
      
   2007 X+M  
Status 
   US  EU 
Chile  15.7  21.6  US: FTA signed in 2003; implemented in Nov. 2004. 
EU: AA
 since 2003 
Israel  26.8  36.2  US: FTA since 1985 
EU: Cooperation Agreement in 1975; AA since 2000. 
Mexico  377.4  51.4  US: FTA since 1994 (NAFTA) 
EU: FTA since 2000 
Cariforum
b  31.5  10.9  US: FTA with Dominican Republic in 2007 (CAFTA-DR). 
EU: EPA signed in December 2007 
Korea  83.3  91.7  US: FTA signed in June 2007 
EU: EPA negotiations since May 2007 
Andean 
Community
c 
38.5  20.0  US: FTA with Colombia signed in Nov. 2006;  
       FTA with Peru signed in April 2006 and ratified in Dec. 2007. 
EU: AA negotiations since 2007 
Mercosur
d  58.4  89.0  US: Part of moribund FTAA negotiations 
EU: FCA since 1992 (1990 for Argentina).  
       AA negotiations since 2000. 
ASEAN-10
e  179.6  190.3  US: EAI with ASEAN-10; TIFA in 2006; FTA with Singapore signed in 
       2004; FTA talks with Thailand and Malaysia not completed. 
EU: FTA negotiations since 2007.  
India  42.2  76.7  US: Launched Trade Policy Forum in 2005; no current trade 
       negotiations, but vetted BIT. 
EU: TIA negotiations since 2007 
Morocco  2.1  28.5  US: FTA signed in June 2004; implemented in Jan. 2006. 
EU: Euromed EPA since 1995 
Subtotal 855.5  616.4   
Share of 
World Trade 
(%) 
27.7 17.1 
 
Memorandum:      
 World Two-
Way Trade  3,085.2 3,600.9
f 
 
All values $ billion.    
a. AA: Association Agreement; BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaty; EIA: Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative;  EPA: 
Economic Partnership Agreement; FCA: Framework Cooperation Agreement; FTA: Free Trade Agreement; 
TIA: Trade and Investment Agreement; and TIFA: Trade Investment Framework Agreement.  
b. The Cariforum countries are; Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint 
Christopher and Nevis, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Data for Antigua and Barbuda is not available. 
c. The Andean community countries are: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
d. Mercosur countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  
e. ASEAN 10 countries are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
f. The figure does not include the intra-EU trade.  
      
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics CD ROM, April 2009, IMF 
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transatlantic countries also have both sought—with mixed success--free trade 
ventures with Latin American countries.  Both have tried to engage Brazil in 
broader regional agreements. Here again, EU officials sought to “compete” 
against US initiatives, in particular the ambitious and now dormant negotiation of 
a Free Trade Area of the Americas, by negotiating an association agreement with 
the Mercosur partners (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). 
Finally, both transatlantic powers have undertaken trade talks with Russia, 
primarily in the context of ongoing negotiations on that country’s WTO 
accession.  In addition, the European Union and Russia signed a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1997.  In May 2008, EU member states agreed on a 
mandate to renew negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement, going 
beyond WTO obligations (once Russia has acceded) and focusing particularly on 
regulatory barriers to trade.  By contrast, the United States does not have a 
framework for trade relations with Russia.  When Russia accedes to the WTO, the 
US Congress will have to pass legislation to confer most-favored-nation treatment 
to Russia on a permanent basis. 
  In sum, US and European policies regarding regional trade initiatives 
seem to be converging, and largely toward the US model.  The share of total US 
and EU trade covered by these competing initiatives is small (27 percent of total 
US trade and 16 percent of total EU trade),
18  but the trade shares do not capture 
the importance of these pacts in terms of advancing foreign policy interests and in 
pushing the envelope of economic reforms, especially in the area of services and 
investment.  However, domestic support for these initiatives—in both the United 
States and in Europe—is tepid in part because the public perceives that these 
accords benefit investors more than production workers.  Indeed, the US and 
European policy debate is now being driven largely by the concerns of domestic 
firms and workers that face large-scale restructuring and tough import 
competition from the BRICKs and other countries.  Again, this factor explains in 
large measure the strong backlash against the BRICKs and the difficulty that the 
transatlantic powers have had in crafting agreements in the current multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
 
Transatlantic Cooperation and the BRICKs 
 
The United States and the European Union are the world’s leading trading 
nations; the transatlantic powers also are each other’s main trading partners in 
goods and services, and are tied together through extensive FDI in each other’s 
                                                 
18 However, if one includes countries that have trade pacts with only one of the transatlantic 
partners (e.g., Canada for the US; Mediterranean countries for the EU), the relative trade share 
increases significantly. 
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both sides.  Throughout the postwar era, both partners have worked together to 
their mutual benefit and have led the GATT/WTO and the world economy 
through successive periods of reconstruction, trade liberalization, and 
globalization.  The fact that GATT/WTO membership has grown from 23 in 1947 
to 153 in 2009 is a clear testament to their successful stewardship. 
Going forward, however, the transatlantic partners need to adapt both the 
content of world trade talks and the governance of world trade relations to the 
economic reality of the 21
st century.  A successful Doha could yield sizeable 
welfare gains, a large part of which would accrue to the United States and the 
European Union.  More importantly, it could contribute to lifting millions of 
people out of poverty.  The challenge will be to update and revamp the WTO 
negotiating agenda inscribed in the Doha Declaration of November 2001 so that it 
better addresses the key problems that now face international commerce, as well 
as the economic concerns of the BRICKs.
19  If these challenges are not taken up 
promptly, the Doha Round could drift into a deep and prolonged hibernation.  
More worrisome, if Doha becomes the first round to fail, it would extensively 
damage the viability of the rules-based multilateral trading system.  Both the 
BRICKs and the transatlantic partners need to work actively together to prevent 
such a costly outcome from unfolding. 
To date, however, the BRICKs seem overly complacent that the status quo 
in the WTO will be maintained and not undercut by a new wave of protectionism.  
Even as they demand and merit a stronger voice in WTO decisions, the BRICKs 
have been seemingly unwilling to accept leadership responsibilities.  China, for 
example, has not represented the positions of other developing countries in the 
Doha Round; indeed, many developing country members are reluctant to engage 
in the WTO negotiations because of concerns regarding competition from China.  
While Brazil deserves credit for organizing an agricultural caucus to try to bridge 
differences between developed and developing countries, the group has been 
better in discussing what it opposes than what it supports (largely due to frictions 
among the G-20 caucus members).  Korea has been indifferent to the WTO talks, 
and India has been a principal footdragger because of its refusal to consider 
reforms of its agricultural policies.  Russia, of course, is not yet a member and has 
been in the forefront in erecting new protectionist barriers in response to the 
global economic crisis in 2008-2009. 
Bluntly put, the BRICKs want to be players but not leaders of the WTO.  
Unlike previous rounds, they have worked hard to push their national priorities 
both in terms of their “offensive” export interests and their “defensive” interests 
                                                 
19 Just prior to the WTO meetings in Geneva in late July 2008, I proposed a 5-step approach to 
Doha rehabilitation that included substantive additions to the negotiating agenda.  See Schott 
2008. 
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given much weight to systemic factors (i.e., the general benefit of improved 
rulemaking or the costs of inaction or failed negotiation).   
  Thus, it falls to the United States and Europe to work together to finish 
the Doha Round—this is critically important for the maintenance of a viable 
multilateral trading system.  The transatlantic powers need to lead by example by 
improving their offers to liberalize trade in goods, services, and agriculture.  Such 
initiatives are necessary but not sufficient to put together a final Doha package; 
the BRICKs and a few other major trading nations will also have to reciprocate, 
especially in services, to ensure that the Doha deal can close and can be 
successfully ratified by national legislatures. 
  To do so, the transatlantic partners and the BRICKs need to find a 
common bridge to link their divergent positions…and they need to look no farther 
than the challenge of melding trade obligations to the environmental imperative to 
mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  For a variety of reasons, developing 
common approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a priority for both 
environmental and trade reasons.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel put the 
topic in the top echelon of challenges facing the G-8 at the 2007 summit; the 
Obama administration will accord the topic similar priority (in contrast to its 
predecessor). 
  The environmental issue already is being pursued to a limited extent in 
the current Doha negotiations.  At the December 2007 UN conference in Bali, the 
European Union and the United States put forward a two-tier proposal.  The first 
tier calls for all WTO members to scrap tariffs on at least 43 products identified as 
climate friendly by the World Bank, including solar panels, wind mill turbines, 
clean coal and energy efficient lighting.  The second calls for an agreement 
between all members establishing further binding commitments for eliminating 
tariffs and nontariff barriers on green technologies.  Developing countries 
criticized the proposal for excluding biofuels (which, oddly, are categorized as 
agricultural goods for the purposes of WTO negotiations). 
  In 2009, the United States and European Union will give priority to 
developing a global regime on climate change that supersedes the Kyoto Protocol.  
Both will need to work together to elaborate plans to address competitiveness 
concerns that could arise under a new carbon regime, to resolve bilateral frictions 
over biofuel subsidies, and to ensure that a new international compact (or 
compacts) provides for substantial reductions in GHG emissions in a manner that 
is equitable for all the major emitting countries. 
  In the near term, neither US nor EU officials seem likely to put their 
extensive subsidies for biofuels—which are designed to promote domestic 
production and thus require trade restrictions against biofuel imports—on the 
Doha negotiating table.  Subsidies and taxes to encourage energy efficiency and 
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when the subsidies go to their constituents and the taxes are applied against 
foreign competitors.  In the post-Doha era, however, these positions are likely to 
change.  Europe’s biggest car and truck makers are pushing for a global deal on 
climate change—and WTO rules will have to be recast to complement the 
initiatives taken in the environmental accords.  The challenge will be to engage 
the BRICKs, who count among the world’s largest emitters of GHGs, to find 
effective solutions.   
  Another topic of common interest for the European Union, the United 
States, and the BRICKs involves the broad area of food security and food and 
product safety.  In 2008, soaring food prices led some producing nations to limit 
food exports in a “beggar thy neighbor” attempt to temper inflation and food 
shortages.  Food safety concerns, already manifested in the BSE and GM foods 
controversies, will intensify—as will concerns about the safety of products from 
China and other developing country suppliers.  As producers and consumers, the 
BRICKs and the transatlantic partners should be working together in the Doha 
Round (preferably as part of an early harvest of the negotiations) to ensure that 
trade policy does not obstruct access to critical food supplies in developing 
countries. 
With the world economy suffering its worst decline since the 1930s, and 
the Doha Round negotiations adrift, the stage is set for a resurgence of 
protectionism.  The temptation, already evidenced in Geneva in late July 2008, 
will be to throw brickbats at the new economic powers on the world stage.  But 
that won’t help restore global economic growth or resolve the key problems of 
food, trade, and the environment that beset rich and poor alike.  Both the 
transatlantic partners and the BRICKs need to respond constructively to 
protectionist impulses and to work cooperatively to develop solutions to major 
new challenges facing the global economy. 
In sum, the rise of the BRICKs does not diminish the critical need for the 
United States and the European Union to continue to take responsibility for 
leading the world trading system.  But it will require them to collaborate closely 
with the BRICKs to produce meaningful results. 
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GATT/WTO Trade Rounds, 1947-2007 
 
 
Name of Round 
 
 
Time Period 
 
Number of 
Member Countries
1.  Geneva 1947  23 
 
2.  Annecy 1949  33 
 
3.  Torquay  1950  34 
 
4.  Geneva  1956  22 
 
5. Dillon Round  1960-1961  45 
 
6.  Kennedy Round  1963-1967  48 
 
7.  Tokyo Round  1973-1979  99 
 
8.  Uruguay Round  1986-1994  117 as of end 1993 
 
9.  Doha Round  2001-?  153 as of end 2008 
 
 
Source: WTO, World Trade Report 2007, p. 198 
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